Preference profiles that are single-peaked on trees enjoy desirable properties: they admit a Condorcet winner (Demange 1982), and there are hard voting problems that become tractable on this domain (Yu et al., 2013). Trick (1989) proposed a polynomial-time algorithm that finds some tree with respect to which a given preference profile is single-peaked. However, some voting problems are only known to be easy for profiles that are single-peaked on "nice" trees, and Trick's algorithm provides no guarantees on the properties of the tree that it outputs. To overcome this issue, we build on the work of Trick and Yu et al. to develop a structural approach that enables us to compactly represent all trees with respect to which a given profile is single-peaked. We show how to use this representation to efficiently find the "best" tree for a given profile, according to a number of criteria; for other criteria, we obtain NP-hardness results. In particular, we show that it is NP-hard to decide whether an input profile is single-peaked with respect to a given tree. To demonstrate the applicability of our framework, we use it to identify a new class of profiles that admit an efficient algorithm for a popular variant of the Chamberlin-Courant rule.

We investigate two systems of fully proportional representation suggested by Chamberlin & Courant and Monroe. Both systems assign a representative to each voter so that the "sum of misrepresentations" is minimized. The winner determination problem for both systems is known to be NP-hard, hence this work aims at investigating whether there are variants of the proposed rules and/or specific electorates for which these problems can be solved efficiently. As a variation of these rules, instead of minimizing the sum of misrepresentations, we considered minimizing the maximal misrepresentation introducing effectively two new rules. In the general case these "minimax" versions of classical rules appeared to be still NP-hard. We investigated the parameterized complexity of winner determination of the two classical and two new rules with respect to several parameters. Here we have a mixture of positive and negative results: e.g., we proved fixed-parameter tractability for the parameter the number of candidates but fixed-parameter intractability for the number of winners. For single-peaked electorates our results are overwhelmingly positive: we provide polynomial-time algorithms for most of the considered problems. The only rule that remains NP-hard for single-peaked electorates is the classical Monroe rule.